




THE ROLE OF NETWORKS IN COLLECTIVE ACTION WITH 
COSTLY COMMUNICATION 
 




Individuals frequently contribute their resources voluntarily to provide public goods. This paper 
models the manner in which the linkage between members in a community influences the likelihood 
of such actions through spontaneous activism in networks. The model I use abstracts from the issue 
of free-riding behavior by means of small deviations from standard preferences. Instead, it 
concentrates on the communication aspect of provision through collective action. The solution 
concept is Nash equilibrium. 
I find that the likelihood of efficient provision of a discrete public good in random social networks 
increases very rapidly for parameter values where the network experiences a phase transition and 
large-scale decentralized activism becomes feasible. As a result, the model shows that succesful 
coordination may be more readily achieved the larger the population is, provided its members are 
sufficiently connected. In contrast with previous results in the literature, this results holds even as 
the size of the population increases without bound, and it is consistent with the existence of large-
scale activism in large populations.  
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EL PAPEL DE LAS REDES EN LA ACCION COLECTIVA CON 
COSTOS DE COMUNICACION 
 




Es frecuente que las personas contribuyan voluntariamente sus recursos privados para la provisión 
de bienes públicos. Este trabajo modela la manera en que las conexiones entre los miembros de 
una comunidad afecta la probabilidad de tales acciones mediante la aparición de grupos activistas. 
El modelo se concentra en el papel de la comunicación entre individuos y deja de lado el problema 
del free-riding. El concepto de solución es el Equilibrio de Nash. 
El trabajo encuentra que la probabilidad de provisión eficiente de un bien público en una red social 
aleatoria presenta dos regímenes. Si el nivel de conexión de la red es bajo, la probabilidad de 
activismo es baja y decrece al aumentar la población. En contraste, por encima de una 
conectividad crítica, la probabilidad de activismo en gran escala es finita y aumenta en relación 
directa con el tamaño de la población. La transición entre los regímenes es abrupta y corresponde 
a un cambio de fase. Si la conectividad de la población aumenta al crecer el número de individuos, 
la probabilidad de provisión del bien público es finita incluso en comunidades grandes. Este 
resultado es consistente con la existencia de activismo en gran escala. 
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Clasificación JEL: D70, H41, Z13 1 Introduction
A standard public ¯nance result predicts that, in large populations with incomplete
information, e±cient private provision of a public good through voluntary contribu-
tions is unlikely to obtain due to the free-rider problem. Having many individuals
involved in providing a public good may spread the individual cost, but it also makes
coordination more di±cult to achieve.
In this paper, I argue that the accuracy of this prediction depends strongly
on the underlying communication structure of the population itself. Given certain
connectivity conditions, successful coordination (and thus provision of the good)
may become more likely as the population increases. This is true even if the per-
capita cost of provision of the good remains constant.
Most communities are incomplete networks: no coordinating agent, centralized
or otherwise, can reasonably expect to reach all other members of it at will. I ask
then what degree of coordination among willing members is feasible if communica-
tion among them is restricted. At its most fundamental level, my argument relies
on the observation that coordination need not be centralized, as two people can
cooperate without ever meeting directly, through intermediaries who all agree to
act together towards some common goal.1
I model the problem of private provision of a discrete pure public good as a game
in a community whose members can communicate only by word of mouth. There are
two types of individuals with di®erent attitudes towards cooperation. Provision of
the good occurs in a decentralized manner, through the actions of private individuals
who ¯nd it in their own interest to either make a direct monetary contribution, or
coordinate with others at a cost (activism). Central to this activism is the ability
of each community member to talk to others, determined by the linkages among
them. This underlying structure of the society, which I call connectivity,2 is loosely
related to the concept of social capital in the political science discourse. In its
attempt to formalize this idea of social connectivity as applied to a concrete public
good problem, this paper makes contributes to the public ¯nance literature. The
mathematical results I use, on the other hand, have their roots in the theory of
random graphs.
The main prediction of the model is that, in some cases, an increase in population
size raises the likelihood of emergence of collective action in a community. Large-
scale activism, which may not be incentive compatible{or even feasible{in smaller
populations due to communication constraints, becomes optimal as more members
join the community. The results holds true even if the average per-capita cost of
1Through a friend of a friend of a friend...
2I use the term connectivity in a manner di®erent from its formal meaning in graph theory.
In the context of this model, connectivity refers to the general features of the social network and
embodies loosely a number of formal properties of random graphs like the degree distribution,
clustering and connectivity. For a formal de¯nition of these terms, see [10], [33], [48].
1provision is constant. The reason is that the additional members in the community
improve the connectivity among existing members. This is consistent with the
existence of such activism in large populations, and it stands in contrast with the
previous literature on this topic.
Private provision of public goods The literature on private provision of pub-
lic goods and the emergence of cooperation is very extensive. Its main prediction,
available in a wide variety of versions, is that the good will be undersupplied, a
problem that becomes worse in the presence of incomplete information. From an
isolated individual's perspective, this is the result of bene¯ts that are spread over a
group while the costs are not.[42] From the perspective of the potential bene¯ciaries
as a group, the failure to obtain e±cient provision stems from a more subtle but
pervasive problem, namely the free-rider incentive: each individual within the group
has an incentive to delegate to other members the actions (and the costs) necessary
to provide the public good. This incentive will exist as long as she knows that her
contribution is not indispensable for provision and that someone else may step in in
her stead. It is closely related to the incentive to cheat in game theory's prisoner's
dilemma and the lack of self-restraint in the tragedy of the commons.[37],[38],[21]
Standard approaches to the solution to this problem are coercion, voluntary co-
ordination and the establishment of markets by means of allocation of property
rights.[14] It's easy to ¯nd examples of each one. Centralized coercion as a mecha-
nism for provision of public goods is represented by government taxation and more
generally by regulation, both frequently used in this context. Collections of old
clothes of food for charity are a familiar ¯xture of neighborhood life for many of us.
Decentralized market solutions implemented through legislation are not uncommon
in pollution issues. Still, while the fundamentals of coercion and property rights al-
location are relatively well understood, voluntary coordination{collective action{has
proven more troublesome to explain, even though it is patently widespread.3
Private provision of public goods is usually modeled in the literature as a game
between all potential bene¯ciaries where each submits a voluntary contribution.
Typically, the players have standard egoistic preferences. In the case of continuous
public goods, where the level of provision is to be determined, the theory pre-
dicts underprovision unless some unwilling individuals can be forced to contribute.
(Bergstrom et al. [9]) For discrete public goods, on the other hand, the results are
less clear-cut, in part because the choice of game form (mechanism) turns out to be
decisive in the feasibility of e±cient outcomes. Two types of games are commonly
analyzed, namely contribution and subscription games. In contribution games, the
players must pay their contributions as they make them, and no refund is given,
regardless of the provision outcome. Subscription games, on the other hand, de-
mand payment if and only if the good is successfully provided, and thus require the
availability of contract enforcement to be feasible. Bagnoli and Lipman [5] show
3Andreoni (1990) [4] tackles the question of charitable giving, arguably an indirect example of
collective action. Ostrom (1990) [38] studies more direct evidence of emergence of collective action.
2that, under complete information, one-shot contribution games are ine±cient, but
the core actually implements the e±cient allocations in subscription games, a result
that carries over to countable public goods but collapses as the good becomes conti-
nous. Admati and Perry [1] derive a similar result for a dynamic setting where the
players take turns to make contributions to the good in a game with several rounds,
and Marx and Matthews [30] extend this result to games where players can act si-
multaneously, provided the current aggregate level of collection is public knowledge
at each round.
As one should expect, e±ciency su®ers if information is incomplete. Among one-
shot incomplete information games, subscription has a higher probability of achiev-
ing e±ciency than contribution, but both are less than perfectly e±cient (Menezes
et al. [31]). Worse yet, Mailath and Postlewaite [29] show that for balanced budget
mechanisms the probability of an ine±cient outcome converges asymptotically to
one in large populations.
All of these results abstract implicitly from the issue of communication. They
assume that any relevant contacts between agents take place. However, in large
populations, whether a contact can be established between interested parties plays
an important role in the feasibility of any outcome. Analyzing the equilibria of
repeated games with random matching, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite [36] prove
that, if public signals about a player's previous behavior are available, certain co-
operative pooling equilibria exist that amount to social norms. In an in°uential
paper, Kandori [24] shows that decentralized coordination, albeit an equilibrium in
in¯nitely repeated prisoner dilemma games with random matching, is not a robust
outcome in large populations when there is no information transmission about past
behavior of the players. Nevertheless, allowing for local information transmission
succeeds in creating robust equilibria with voluntary local enforcement of good be-
havior (i.e. punishment of deviators). A degree of communication is hence necessary
for decentralized cooperation to be viable. The importance of the communication
network's structure is further emphasized by Chwe [13], who analyzes optimal net-
working for collective action under simple decision rules when each player's decision
depends strongly on the perfectly observable actions of a subset of other players.
Summarizing, there are two main issues at hand when considering the private
provision of public goods: (1) when are the group size and communication structure
such that coordination is feasible and reasonably likely to succeed?; and (2) why
does any individual, or group of such, start costly actions towards coordination in
spite of the free-rider incentive?
The feasibility question precedes the incentive issue in a logical sense: no costly
action would take place if it were known to be doomed to fail. This paper addresses
the ¯rst question and abstracts from the free-rider problem. Accepted wisdom ar-
gues that there is a tension between, on one hand, the need for a group large enough
to spread the costs of provision, and on the other hand the rising costs of coordi-
nating such large groups, be they due to informational requirements or otherwise.
3However, the theoretical literature on private provision of public goods has failed
to include such costs as part of the coordinating mechanisms. The accepted intu-
ition argues that centralized coordination is costly (Kandori [24]), and that as a
result increasing group size may deter coordination initiatives from taking place.
Moreover, even after such coordination has happened, centralized enforcement of
the agreements is more di±cult in large groups. I show that this intuition is not
necessarily correct: coordination may be easier in larger groups.
The model I use in this paper to model provision of a discrete public good has
elements of a contribution game (for activists) and a subscription game (for the rest
of the population). The player's payo®s are private information. Preferences are
non-standard, as individuals derive a disutility from lying. Centralized coordination
is implicitly ruled out by the inability of individuals to directly contact members
of the population other than those in a certain small subset, but some limited
information transmission occurs within groups of activists. The outcome features a
pattern of activism that is local from an individual's perspective (arguably reducing
the problem of rising costs of coordination), but global in its reach (thus achieving
the necessary large group of contributors).
Random graphs Loosely speaking, a graph is a set of elements (called vertices)
which may be linked to each other (by edges). More formally, a graph ¡ has is
two sets: the set of vertices V (¡) and the set of edges E (¡). A random graph
adds to this a probability distribution over the existence of each possible edge.4 The
theory of random graphs applies probabilistic methods to analyze a number of macro
properties of the graph. The interest in the macro picture rather than individual
vertices leads to a treatment that considers permutations of vertices to yield the
same graph (i.e. the graph resulting from swapping the names and positions of two
vertices is considered to be the same). That is also the case in this paper.
The model used here is a version called the binomial random graph model, where
each link exists with some probability q. As with almost all results in graph the-
ory, the ones I use are asymptotic in nature. Most arguments presented here are
exactly true only for in¯nite populations. However, a very convincing case with
vast evidence has been made that ¯nite graphs converge relatively quickly to their
limiting behavior, so that these results are a good approximation of the features of
large ¯nite populations.5 Moreover, the intuition and phenomena I describe in this
paper, in particular the formation of a giant component, are robust features of many
types of random networks.6 I argue that they provide insights into some collective
phenomena in societies, activism among them.
4Throughout the paper, when there's no possibility of confusion, I use the letter ¡ to refer both
to the random graph and, sometimes, a particular realization of it.
5See [2], [10], [33], [45].
6See [2], [33], [23], [34], [35], [45].
4I have included a summary of the results and properties of binomial random
graphs used here in the Appendix A.7
In the next section, as a benchmark, I introduce a typical static game that
models the decentralized public good provision decision as is usually considered in
the public economics literature. Then, in section 3, I add a network structure to
the population and build a simple static game where individuals choose between
an uncoordinated solution or an approach involving activism to provide the good.
In section 4 I discuss the e±ciency implications of an incomplete communication
network. Section 5 presents some comparative statics results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The problem
Consider a population of n individuals (n a large number), each indexed by i 2 N =
f1;2;:::;ng and endowed with wi units of a numeraire good x.
Suppose that the individuals have heterogeneous preferences de¯ned over con-
sumption of a discrete public good G and the numeraire x:
Ui = ui (xi;G) (1)
@ui=@xi > 0
The public good can be either provided (G = 1) at a cost G, or not provided
(G = 0). Let person i's willingness to pay for the public good (i.e. her valuation)
be given by the scalar gi ¸ 0, implicitly de¯ned by
ui (wi ¡ gi;1) = ui (wi;0) (2)
and assume that
Pn
i=1 gi > G so that it is Pareto-e±cient to have G = 1, provided
suitable lump-sum transfers of the numeraire can be made among the individuals.8
Assume also that for all j 2 N, G¡j ´
Pn
i=1 gi¡gj > G, so that the provision of
G is feasible, even if some of the individuals who have gi > 0 do not contribute to pay
the cost G (i.e. even with some free-riders). Further assume that each individual i
knows that G¡i > G, but she cannot observe other individuals' gj.
Consider then the static game where each individual, acting strategically, makes
a voluntary contribution of zi units of the numeraire good to be used for provision
of the public good. The public good is provided if
Pn
i=1 zi > G. All individuals
present their contributions simultaneously, so no one knows in advance how much
other individuals will contribute. The utility of an individual i will then be
ui (wi ¡ zi;1) if G = 1
ui (wi;0) if G = 0
7Further, very detailed references include [2], [10], [22], [33], [45], [46], [47].
8Note that the assumption gi ¸ 0 implies that ui (x;1) ¸ ui (x;0) for all i, so that G is indeed
a good for everybody.
5In general, the Nash equilibria of this static problem need not guarantee G = 1.
(Bagnoli and Lipman [5]) Those that imply provision are such that the sum of
contributions barely covers the cost of provisions and each contributor is pivotal.
The reason for the ine±cient outcomes is the free-rider problem: each individual,
knowing that her contribution is not necessary to achieve provision of the good, may
choose to rely on other people's contributions since, ceteris paribus, she's better o®
consuming all her endowment privately.
In a broader setting, the free-rider problem has been interpreted to mean that
some degree of enforceable coordination is necessary to achieve e±ciency in this
game. If such coordination is costly, the expectation is that it will become more
di±cult to attain the larger the number of individuals in the population.
One instance of such coordination cost has to do with communication constraints.
In a world with incomplete information, it is seldom true that an individual (or a
centralized authority, for that matter) can reasonably expect to reach everybody
she may want or need to. Indeed, very often she won't even be aware of who it is
she should reach. A typical individual knows about the preferences and resources of
those she has contact with in daily life (work, social activities) and perhaps of some
limited set of public individuals in her community, but not much more. And even if
she knew that a particular person could aid her to achieve a certain goal, she might
think that the contact cannot be established at a reasonable cost.
As it is, the game presented above has no means to analyze or even suggest these
limitations in communications. Therefore, I propose a game that models explicitly
the coordination aspect of decentralized public good provision. In section 3 I con-
struct a community where any given member has access to a relatively small random
subset of other members. I explore then the feasibility of large scale coordination
among individuals to provide a discrete pure public good. The focus of the analysis
is not whether some individuals would voluntarily engage in coordinating activities
(this is exogenously assumed), but rather whether they should reasonably expect to
be successful given their constrained reach and the fact that coordination is costly.
A very interesting result indicates that the traditional intuition against coordi-
nation in large groups may be at odds with the realities of a networked community
with costly, limited interaction possibilities. In this setting, success may be more
likely in larger rather than smaller populations, and a second-best outcome may
require that a substantial amount of resources be devoted to increasing the size of
the coordinated groups through activism. The driving element behind this result
is a sudden transition in the properties of the communication network used by the
members of the community.
3 A model with activists
I introduce now some changes to the model seen in the previous section in order
to consider a game where activism is an explicit option. I simplify as much as
6possible the distribution of individual preferences and add a network structure to
the population. This setting will enable me to model the formation of activist groups
that strive to achieve provision of the public good G.
Two types of individuals First, assume that there are two exogenously given
types of individuals, called V (for volunteer) and R (for reluctant). Each person's
type is private information. Volunteers are people who o®er their contributions to
the community without trying to free-ride. They are a fraction ± 2 (0;1) of the
total population n. Reluctant individuals, on the other hand, only give money if
asked to, and even then not always, as they may try to free-ride as seen below.
Preferences Individuals' preferences depend on the type. V -types are homo-
geneous, and their valuation of the public good is given by gV > G
n.
R-type individuals also have homogeneous preferences. They value the public
good at gR > G






Communication network Assume that any two individuals i 6= j in the
population are linked (\are neighbors") with a publicly known probability q 2 (0;1]
independent of i and j. The individuals in this population thus conform a random
graph with n vertices, denoted hereafter ¡n;q. Realizations of such a graph are
depicted in ¯gure ?? and ¯gure 5 of Appendix A.
The links allow neighbors to interact with each other in a manner described
later. They are exogenously given, and direct interaction between two individuals
is feasible if and only if they are neighbors. Given a population size n, the network
communication properties are characterized by the connectivity q 2 (0;1].
Actions The model is a Stackelberg game with several branches. Each type
of individual is assumed to have a di®erent set of available actions.
R-type individuals are followers in all cases, and their set of available options is
reduced to accepting or rejecting any proposals made to them at time t = 2 by any
activist neighbors they have. If an R-type makes a pledge, she is called a supporter.
Otherwise, she is a non-supporter. R-types cannot transmit any information other
than this acceptance or rejection of the proposals.
9Truthfulness, as will be seen later, has a very precise meaning in this model. In the mean
time, a rough approximation should su±ce: an individual is truthful if she does not lie about her
valuation of the public good when asked.
This type of preference can be obtained as a result of prevailing social norms or, alternatively,
of warm-glow utility. (See Appendix B.)
7V -type players are the leaders. At time t = 1, they have to choose between being
passive or active. If some volunteer chooses the passive course, a collection box is
placed in the center of town, and each individual can put any voluntary contribution
she wants in it.
The active course, on the other hand, involves costly activism. Each V -type who
chooses the active course at t = 1 (and becomes an activist) immediately incurs a
cost D1 and contacts her neighbors, thus starting a coordination drive. This ¯rst
activist drive has the objective of ¯nding and meeting with other V -type individuals
to coordinate future actions with them. Therefore, the cost D1 is perhaps best
viewed as a contribution of time rather than money. The process of contact and
coordination occurs by word of mouth, so that contacts can only happen between
neighbors. I assume that coordination is achieved between any two activists that
establish contact this way. This coordination is also transitive, as i coordinated with
j and j coordinated with k necessarily implies that i is coordinated with k.10
After the coordination drive is over, each coordinated group of activists is called
an activist cell. Each activist then knows the size of her own activist cell and whether
it is the largest existing activist cell.
Activists who are not in the largest activist cell stop all actions at this point.
Activists in that largest cell, denoted C, face the choice between inaction or a
fundraising drive at time t = 2.11 If the fundraising drive takes place, each member
of C incurs an additional personal cost D2. The drive involves approaching other
members in the population and asking for a monetary contribution in the amount of
p (the proposed pledge) to provide the public good. It is assumed that each activist
in C must also pledge p. The amount p must be set in advance of the drive, and
it cannot be changed after the number of actual contributors is known. Any funds
raised in excess of the cost of provision of the public good G are disposed of and
serve no useful purpose.
Communication between neighboring activists is assumed frictionless and cost-
less after the cost D1 has been incurred. All monetary contributions from players are
collected at the end of the game, but only if the cost of the public good is covered.
The in°uence of the network structure on the extent of coordination is the focus
of this paper.
Information At the outset of the game, n;q;±;gV;gR;h and the type of net-
work are public information. The type of each individual (V or R) is private infor-
mation.
10As a convention, an activist is always coordinated with herself.
11If there is more than one group with the largest amount of activists, I assume that all of
them go on with the fundraiser decision. While this does not a®ect the likelihood of activism,
it has consequences for e±ciency. It is clearly undesirable to have redundant, disjoint e®orts to
provide the public good. As will be seen later, eliminating such redundancy is one of the sources
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(Y– D1 – D2)
FIGURE 1: Decision sequence for V -types
Notes: All decisions in this tree are made by V -type individuals. W is the expected payo® to
activists outside the largest cell from the choices of the activists in the largest cell. p¤ is the actual
pledge.
As stated above, the cost of activism D1 is assumed to enable an individual to
share information with her neighbors. Consequently, non-activists are not able to
transmit any information at time t = 1, nor can they take part in coordination in
any way. The number of members in any given cell is known to activists within that
cell, and each activist knows whether her cell is the largest at time t = 2.
Timing The time sequence is presented if Fig.1. The payo® Y represents the
best possible outcome without activism.
In the remainder of this section, I derive the optimal choice rules for the agents
in this model. In 3.1, I analyze the decision rules for R-type individuals. Then, in
3.2, I present the results for the optimal decisions of V -types in the extreme case
where q = 1. In this case the community is a complete network and it is possible
for any activist to reach any other individual. This is the implicit standard in most
of the literature of collective action and coordination, so it is useful to have it as a
benchmark. In 3.3 I deal with the the optimal decisions of V -types in an incomplete
network. I ¯rst consider the case where no activism takes place, which is in some
sense the outside option. Then I analyze the alternatives where activism is chosen.
In particular, I show that the outcome depends critically on the communication
network described here.
93.1 R-type choice: supporter vs. non-supporter
It is easiest to start by analyzing the decision of R-types, since they are followers at
every stage. This is the manner of fundraising that may take place: An activist j
contacts all her R-type neighbors with a proposed contract. She asks each neighbor
whether he would be willing to pledge the amount p in order to get provision of
the public good. Payments are due only after all pledges are in, conditional on
successful provision.
The R-type neighbor then gives an answer, yes or no, depending on his valuation
of the good. Note that there's no immediate cost in becoming a supporter, but
there's the issue of whether or not the neighbor is willing to lie about his valuation
of the good to save the amount p in the future.12
If an R-type accepts a pledge p and at the end of the game she has to contribute,
her payo® if gR + h ¡ p. If she does not accept, but there's provision without her
contribution, her payo® is gR+h (if she has been truthful), and gR (if not). Finally,
if there's no provision, she gets h only if she has been truthful, and zero otherwise.
As will be seen later, in equilibrium no R-type ever lies.
Clearly, if gR < p, the R-type individual will make no pledge and still be truthful.
However, even if i's true valuation is higher than the proposed pledge (gR ¸ p),
she may still try to free-ride by refusing to pledge any money and answering in
the negative, in which case she will lose the warm glow from truthfulness h. In
summary, reluctant types only say yes to the proposed monetary pledge if they
value the good enough and the warm-glow utility e®ectively blocks their natural
free-riding incentive. However, since h < gR, this means that the decision rule for
R-types is simply:13
Do nothing unless asked directly (3)
Accept pledge p i® p · h
12In equilibrium, these supporters will end up paying a positive contribution of at most p, so
the question has very concrete consequences, which are known by the individuals under rationality
assumptions.
13This is actually a stronger condition than necessary. From the perspective of an individual of
type R with who is being asked to contribute p · gR, the options are:
: Say yes Say no
Provision (G = 1) gR + h ¡ p gR
No provision (G = 0) h 0
Thus, if she has a prior ¼ independent of her own action for the probability of provision, the
condition for saying yes to the proposal is ¼gR · ¼
¡
gR + h ¡ p
¢
+(1 ¡ ¼)h. This can be rewritten
as
¼p · h
Since ¼ < 1 , demanding p · h guarantees that i will answer truthfully even if she is sure that
she will actually have to pay.
10The type of interaction just described happens simultaneously at time t = 2
between each activist in the largest cell C and each of her R-type neighbors, provided
the fundraiser takes place.
The maximum contribution that a type-R individual i would pledge when asked
by an activist is thus h. For proposed contributions higher than this amount, in-
dividual i would say she's not interested, even if the contribution were less than
gR.
3.2 V -type choice: complete network q = 1
In the case where communication is unconstrained by the network structure of the
community, the problem yields results in line with the previous literature.
If no activism is chosen, in practice the individuals in this model set out to play
the static one-shot game of private provision of G. By de¯nition of type R, coupled
with the condition that no one reluctant individual be pivotal, no individual i 2 R
will make any voluntary contribution. Thus, zR = 0. The maximum unconditional
voluntary contribution that one could possibly get is given by Zmax = n±gV. If
Zmax > G, the static one-shot game will assure e±cient provision of the good, paid
by the volunteers. On the other hand,
Remark 1 If the maximum voluntary contribution from V -types in the population
is not enough to provide the good
Zmax = n±g
V < G
the outcome of the one-shot, no-activism game is generally ine±cient due to the
free-rider problem.
Consequently, if V -types decide not to engage in activism and they are able to
provide the good, they alone bear the cost of provision. In principle, they may split
that cost in any number of ways, but I focus here on a symmetric solution: each
V -type contributes G
n± units of the private good, their payo®s are gV ¡ G
n± and the
R-types enjoy the public good for free.14 This outcome, if feasible, is the ¯rst-best.
If activism is chosen, the size of the largest activist cell C is simply the total
number of V -types in the population, C = V = n±.15 In addition, if the funding
14If the fund collection is higher than necessary for provision, the extra amount is waste. In the
extreme case where the V -types just trow in the collection box their full valuation, the wasted





w ¡ gV ;1
¢
> 0. However,
I will assume that the collection is barely enough in order to use this option as an e±ciency
benchmark if it is available.
For a detailed analysis of this matter, see [1],[5],[31].
15Throughout the paper, I denote both subsets of the population and their sizes with the same
capital letter. Thus, for example, the size of X µ N is denoted simply X. The only exception is
the size of the population set N, denoted n.
11drive takes place, all R-types are reached and the necessary contribution is G
n.16
The payo®s to the V -types are then gV ¡ D1 ¡ D2 ¡ G
n and to the R-types gR ¡ G
n.
The cost of provision is then e®ectively spread over the population, but the result
involves a welfare loss due to activism
L = A(D1 + D2) = n± (D1 + D2) (4)
In general, the V -types may prefer the activist solution, even if it involves a loss.
As leaders, they have full choice of actions in this game, so activism will take place
if
g












where it is natural to assume gV ¡ D1 ¡ D2 ¡ G
n > 0.
Thus, two cases exist: for ± · G
ngV , provision without activism (¯rst-best) is
not feasible, and the second-best activist choice is the optimal option. It is also
guaranteed to work.
For ± > G
ngV , the outside option is feasible and optimal. Activism only redis-
tributes the cost of provison and generates excess costs. Nevertheless, the ine±cient
activist solution will then obtain if











(1 ¡ ±) (6)
and the excess cost to society due to activism is L.
3.3 V -type choice: incomplete network q 2 (0;1)
In this case, the outside option Y in Fig.1 is assumed to be the same as in the
benchmark case: a collection box is put in the middle of town, and people volunteer
their contributions. No communication is necessary, the box is visible to the whole









if gV ¡ G
n± ¸ 0
(0;0) if gV ¡ G
n± < 0
If the public good is provided, this outcome is e±cient, as the cost is assumed
to be exactly covered.17
16In equilibrium, the cost D1 is incurred only in if the funding drive takes place, since there's
no uncertainty in the game.









FIGURE 2: A path
Notes: Vertices A and E are connected within any set that contains the path X = fB;Dg. They
are not connected within fA;B;E;Fg. Vertices A and G are not connected within the population.
3.3.1 Decentralized activism
I turn now to the optimal choices for V -types in the case where activism is chosen.
De¯nition 1 Let A be the set of all activists in N.
Since the V -types are homogeneous, the set of activists is either empty, or A =
V = n±, where ± is the fraction of individuals of type V in the population.
De¯nition 2 For all m;m0 2 N, de¯ne the scalar amm0 to be 1 if m and m0 are
neighbors, and 0 otherwise. Then i;j 2 N are said to be connected by a path within
a subset X µ N if there exist j1;j2;:::jr 2 X such that aij1aj1j2aj2j3:::ajrj = 1. The
individuals j1;j2;:::jr then conform a path from i to j within X. If no subset is
speci¯ed, it is understood that the individuals are connected within the population
N.
Paths are in a sense extended links in the network. They capture the idea of
transitivity of connections. Suppose Ann knows Bob, who knows Connie, who in
turn knows Dave, who knows{¯nally!{Elsa. Then Bob, Connie and Dave are a path
connecting Ann and Elsa.
To understand the requirement that the path be within a set, consider the fol-
lowing: If Bob, Connie and Dave are members of a social club that encourages
introducing their acquaintances to each other, chances are Ann and Elsa have met.
On the other hand, if Connie were not in the club, then the path would probably
be ine®ectual and Ann would not know Elsa. Fig.?? depicts an example path.
De¯nition 3 A set X µ X0 is a cluster in X0 if any two of its elements are
connected by a path within X, but no element of X is connected by a path to an
element of X0nX within X0.
13Clusters are easily identi¯ed: Start with Bob and ¯nd all people in the club
who are connected to him by a path within the club, and that's Bob's cluster. The
exclusions must be noted, however. Ann does not belong because she's not in the
club. Suppose Zack is in the club, but he only knows Ann. He does not belong to
Bob's cluster because the path to Zack does not lie within the club.
It's easy to see that communication between members of the population is subject
to the following conditions:
Remark 2 Let A be the set of all activists in the population. (1) For any i;j 2 A
to be coordinated, they must be linked by a path within A, and each activist in that
path must also be coordinated with both i and j. Thus, the coordinated groups are
all clusters in A and determine a partition of the set of activists in the population.
(2) For any i 2 A and j = 2 A, interactions between i and j are possible if and only
if they are neighbors.
Remark 2 is useful later in determining the scope and reach of feasible coordi-
nation in the community. Below, I solve the activists' fundraising choice at time
t = 2, and then I proceed to ¯nd their optimal choice at the ¯rst stage, t = 1.
Last stage By de¯nition, the largest activist cell at time t = 2, called C, is
a subset of A. (There may be several such cells.) Note also that all neighbors of
members of an activist cell who are not themselves members of the cell are necessarily
of R-type.
At the last stage of the game, the activists in C face the choice between carrying
out the fundraiser at a cost D2 or not. Since D1 is a sunk cost, their choice will






V ¡ D2 ¡ p
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where ¼C ´ ¼C (p) is the probability of actually achieving provision (G = 1) for a
given proposed pledge p, conditional on C, and ¼¤
C ´ ¼C (p¤), with p¤ the optimal
pledge. The source of this uncertainty ¼C is the fact that it is not known how many
people will be reached by the fundraising drive at the time p is set because the
number of neighbors of activists in C is stochastic.18 The optimal proposed pledge
p¤ takes discrete values: if it is optimal to aim to reach s individuals outside C,
the optimal pledge would be ps = G
C+s. Consequently, if the number s is increased
by one, the optimal pledge decreases discretely to ps+1 = G
C+s+1 < ps. Proposed
18If the number of neighbors were known, the activists would set p = p0 at the exact contribution
value necessary to barely cover G. Should p0 > h, the cost of provision could be spread, and the
fundraiser would take place if gV ¡ D2 ¡ p0 > Y = gV ¡ G
n± or
D2 + p0 <
G
n±
14pledges between those values would generate excess collection if successful (which is
undesirable for the activists, since they pay p¤, too).




















C < gV for gV · G
n±
(7)
where p¤ is the pledge to be asked.







V ¡ D2 ¡ ps
¤






Let ¢s¼C ´ ¼C (ps) ¡ ¼C (ps¡1) and ¢sp ´ ps ¡ ps¡1. The optimality condition for
p¤ is









where increasing s decreases ps.
An optimal pledge in the range ps > gV ¡ Y V cannot ever be asked in an
equilibrium where activism is present, since it implies that the outside option is
better than activism for V -types, even if the costs D1 and D2 were zero.19 Moreover,
whenever the solution of (9) is greater than h, asking for pledge p¤ would not achieve
any redistribution of the provision costs. In consequence, in such a case the activists
in C would choose between a fundraiser with proposed pledge h with probability of
success ¼C (h), or the outside option.20
19Indeed, suppose that at the optimum p¤ is in the high range:
ps > gV ¡ Y V (10)
Then, use ps = G
C+s to obtain G
gV ¡Y V > C + s.
In the case where the outside option is available, this case reduces to n± = A > C + s. Surely,
it does not make sense to incur the cost of activism to reach fewer expected contributors (C + s)
than those that can be reached costlessly through the box in the middle of town (A)! So, in the
presence of an outside option with provision, a necessary (but not su±cient) condition for activism
to obtain is p¤ < gV ¡ Y V .
If the outside option is not available, (10) implies p¤ > gV , and provision with this pledge would
just result too expensive for the V -types. In the absence of a certain alternative for provision,




(corner solution) and hope that
enough R-types are reached to achieve provision, but that is again in the low-p range.
20See Appendix C
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gV ¡ D1 ¡ D2 ¡ p¤¤
+ (1 ¡ ¼¤
C)
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where W = ¼¤
CgV + (1 ¡ ¼¤





C < gV ¡ Y V
i
and the expecta-
tions are taken over all possible outcomes of the size of the largest activist cell C,
conditional on a fundraiser occurring. ° is the probability that a given activist ends
up being a member of one of the largest activist cells{each has size C. Rearranging
this expression one obtains the much more accesible condition:





















C < gV ¡ Y V
i
, the ex-ante probability that a fundraiser takes
place. The expectations are also conditional on the fundraiser.
(11) says that activism is more appealing for a V -type if the fundraiser is likely
to take place and succeed (high ¸ and E [¼¤
C]), or if it is unlikely that she will be
part of it (low E [°]). Of course, it is always desirable for her that the necessary
contributions be low. How do E [°¼¤
Cp¤], E [¼¤
C], E [°] and ¸ relate to each other?
The probability distribution for the size of the largest activist cell is critical to
answer this question. While the exact solution of this problem is available only
for in¯nite n, an extensive body of literature on random graphs has shown that in
large populations the realized size of C is very likely to be close to its expected
value.21 I make use of this feature to approximate the behavior of (11). Moreover,
many of the properties of the distribution of C as n and q grow are known, so that
meaningful comparative statics can be examined in this model. The interesting
feature ultimately is that the expected value of C in an in¯nite population is not
continuous in the parameters that describe the network. This discontinuity a®ects
the right hand side of (11).
(11) is analogous to (5) in the benchmark case. Together with (7) and (3), it
fully characterizes the optimal decisions for all players of the game.
21Janson et al. ([22] Ch.2) give bounds for the deviations from the mean of realizations of
random variables in graphs. However, the speci¯c evidence for the case of the existence and size of
the giant component stems mainly from a large simulation literatute on percolation and networks
[2], [33], [23], [34], [35], [45].
P. ErdÄ os and A. R¶ enyi (1959) [18] prove a more general result relating the size of the set X and
the probability of existence of link between any two of its elements.
This and some other features of random graphs are discussed in the Appendix A. For a more
detailed analysis of random graphs and their properties, see Bollob¶ as (1985) [10], Janson et al.
(2000) [22].
164 E±ciency in the incomplete-network popula-
tion
In this game, as in the complete-network benchmark, any possible outcome that
implies provision of G is more e±cient that an outcome with G = 0. However, if
the outside option is able to provide the public good, activism is simply a costly
way to shift the cost of the public good away from the V -type people. It is thus
undesirable from the perspective of a social planner. This case, while possible,
is not the focus of my analysis. I concentrate here on the case where the public
good cannot be provided by the V -types alone. This seems the more interesting
scenario for practical applications, and it is cumbersome but not di±cult to derive
the corresponding results when the ¯rst-best is feasible.
When activism takes place in an incomplete network, three possibilities arise
that may have an impact on the expected e±ciency of the outcome. First, ex-post
e±ciency may decrease because the redistribution mechanism is less e®ective. There
is a chance that not enough V -types are reached in the coordination drive, or that
too few R-type people are reached by the largest activist cell in the fundraiser. In
this case the V -types would have to take the outside option and the costs of activism
would have been wasted. If the outside option has G = 0, even worse.
Second, since activism now does not guarantee success but does imply costs, the
V -types may actually be deterred from becoming activists at all. This would be
good for e±ciency if the outside option provided the good, but it's bad in the case
analyzed here.
Third, depending on the shape of ¼C (p), there's the possibility that one can reach
enough R-types to achieve redistribution of the cost G without every activist having
to pay D2. Indeed, if just a relatively small number of activists are in the largest
cells, but they reach many R-types, the total cost of fundraising in the community






In the case where the ¯rst-best with voluntary
contributions and no activism is not attainable because gV < G
n±, the existence of
activism may be a desirable second-best outcome. A proposed pledge p¤ that stands
a chance of achieving provision (i.e. p¤ > G
n) may enhance the expected e±ciency
of the outcome. Whether such activism actually obtains depends on condition (11).
As stated above, however, provision may still fail.
If there is no activism, the welfare loss is certain: n¹ g, where ¹ g ´ ±gV +(1 ¡ ±)gR
is the average valuation of the good in the population. Conditional on activism
taking place, the expected welfare loss is A(D1 + ¸E [°]D2) + ¸(1 ¡ E [¼¤
C])n¹ g +
(1 ¡ ¸)n¹ g. Rearrange to obtain:
E [L] =
½
n¹ g if no activism
nf±D1 + ¸E [°]±D2 + (1 ¡ ¸E [¼¤
C]) ¹ gg if activism (12)
17Proposition 5 Suppose that the public good cannot be provided without activism.
The population with q 2 (0;1) can achieve higher e±ciency than the complete-






C] ¹ g ¡ E [°]D2
i
(13)
or (ii) both feature activism and
h









Proof. Immediate from (4) and (12).
As stated previously, E [°] should be low, while E [¼¤
C] and ¸ should be high for
activism to take place in the incomplete network. The ¯rst two requirements also
lower the expected welfare loss from activism in case (i), so that it is not only more
likely but also more desirable. It is interesting to note that in the limit of in¯nite
population, the condition for existence of activism (11) is su±cient to guarantee
that (13) holds.
For case (ii), high E [¼¤
C] and low E [°] also enhance e±ciency. However, the





¹ g , an increase in ¸ makes the incomplete
network more e±cient relative to the benchmark.
This makes sense, since the gains from the network should come precisely from
having good chances of success (high ¼¤
C) with relatively few people incurring the
cost of fundraising (low °). The average valuation of the good re°ects the stakes:
the higher it is, the worse the chance of failure seems. The role of ¸ is somewhat
more complex. On the one hand, it increases the likelihood of incurring cost D2,
but on the other it also decreases the chances of failure of the activism.
As in (11), the relative e±ciency of the di®erent network structures depends
strongly on the probability distribution of the size C of the largest activist groups
and their number, among others. In the next section I show that, in some parameter
ranges, any changes in (11), (13) and (14) are driven almost exclusively by C.
5 Comparative statics in the network
In this section I carry out comparative statics analyses to determine the e®ects of
the network parameters n and q on the existence of activism and the e±ciency of
the activist outcome. I concentrate on the case where the outside option is not
available. This is done for simplicity, and the results are easily generalized.
Assumption 4 In all cases below, the average per-capita cost of the public good
remains constant. Thus, G(n) = n^ g with ^ g constant.
18Assumption 4 insures that the increases in population size do not directly de-
crease the average individual cost of provision of G. This rules out the this possibility
as the driving force behind the results in this section.
Several types of comparative statics analyses are of interest in this model. First,
changes in the extensive parameter n give rise to what I call scaling of the graph.
They correspond to increases in the size of the target population. Second, changes in
the intensive connectivity parameter q are akin to increasing the level of involvement
of individuals with other members within the community. Third, I analyze the
possibility of scaling the population while keeping the expected number of neighbors
of each individual constant. This implies decreases in q and is thus a mix of the two
previous cases. A last case involves changes in the fraction ± of type V individuals.
Its interpretation provides a loose link to standard results in the literature.
These analyses require four assumptions. First, n is assumed to be large, so that
the the asymptotic results are good descriptions of the phenomena. In an in¯nite
population, the variables of interest converge in probability to their expected values.
Second, several changes in this model are inherently discrete, as C and n must
be integers. Nevertheless, for large C and n, I approximate them by continuous
function analysis when considering their e®ects on (9) and (11).
Third, I need to specify the composition of the population N as it is grows.
I assume that the population is scaled up in a manner that does not alter the
distribution of reservation values or types among its members. In other words, ± is
una®ected by the scaling.22 The number of V -types and the aggregate willingness of
the population to contribute will then increase. The cost of provision G will increase
as well. I argue that these changes are not driving the results.
Finally, I assume that the binomial random graph structure remains a good
approximation of the social network. Even with the number of activists in the pop-
ulation a constant fraction of the total, it is reasonable to expect that the underlying
linkage structure changes. This is certainly true in a real community. However, if
the number of people added to the community is relatively small, so will be the
structure changes. In contrast, I'll show that the properties of that structure may
change dramatically.
I show below that the most salient aspect of these comparative statics is related
to the scope and reach of the activist groups that are formed in equilibrium. In
in¯nitely large populations, activism undergoes a phase transition when, on average,
a typical activist knows at least one other activist. Below this threshold, there are
many groups of size C, but C=A = 0, i.e. C is small compared to A. Above the
22Suppose for example that the initial set N is composed of all individuals within certain ¯ve
blocks of a city landmark. A scaling (roughly by a factor of four) is then obtained by increasing
the activists reach to people within ten streets of the same landmark, provided the population has
similar characteristics in the whole neighborhood.
19threshold, there is one single such group, and C is a ¯nite fraction of the whole
population. The transition between these regimes is discrete for the limit of in¯nite
n. For ¯nite populations, although not discontinuous, it is very fast.23 As a result,
(11), (13) and (14) experience large variations with small parameter changes, and
so does the outcome of the game.
I comment next on the comparative statics of the optimal pledge condition and
analyze the e®ect of the network structure parameters on ¸, E [°], E [¼¤
C] and
E [°¼¤
Cp¤]. Then, I determine the relationship between them and the size of the
largest activist cell C. Finally, I derive results for the e®ect of the population size
and its connectivity on the likelihood of the cooperative outcome.
5.1 Changes in the network structure
5.1.1 Behavior of ¸, E [°], E [¼¤
C] and E [°¼¤
Cp¤]
As a ¯rst step, consider the optimal pledge condition (21). Write
s¤ = s¤ (n;C;µ) p¤ = p¤ (C;s¤) ¼¤
C = ¼¤
C (n;µ;s¤)
with µ = µ(q;C) and C = C (n;q;±).
It is di±cult to obtain unambiguous results for the comparative statics of s¤
in all ranges. For instance, it can be shown that, if s¤ À C (if one needs many
contributors per activist), @s¤











@C > 0. These conditions are likely to hold if there are relatively few people in the
fundraiser but the cost G needs to be distributed among many supporters, arguably
the most common rationale for activism. Fig.3 illustrates the response of s¤ to
increases in C or q in this case.







@C are continuous and di®erent from zero. As a result, so is
@¸
@C. Moreover, the same is true for the partial changes of s¤, p¤, ¼¤
C and ¸ with
respect to n or q.
¸ has a very straightforward behavior. In the limit n ! 1 it must be either one
or zero, as there is no uncertainty regarding whether activism takes place. In ¯nite
populations, a larger expected C raises ¸. It does not follow that it is one only if C
is very large; it may be that even with relatively small expected C, activism takes
place. However, if the type of activism required is large-scale, the necessary C will
likely be large compared to N.
° is somewhat more di±cult to analyze. It is equal to the ratio
° =
(number of cells of size C) ¤ C
A





FIGURE 3: Optimal pledge
Notes: The arrows indicate the direction of change of s¤ as C or q increase, given C + s large
enough. The associated proposed pledge is p¤ = ps¤ = G=(C + s¤).
I show below that there may be multiple cells C in some parameter ranges. It is
not clear in general how the sum of its members compares to A. However, at some
point all those cells merge into a unique largest cell C. Then ° is very likely C=A
and rises with C. At the transition, ° may ¯rst fall and then rise, or it may rise all
the time.











In the limit of n ! 1, and E [°¼¤
Cp¤] converges in probability to E [°]E [¼¤
C]E [p¤].
Then, for very large n, the latter is very likely a good approximation for the former.












In a similar manner, approximate (13) and (14) respectively by
±D1 < ¸[¼
¤
C¹ g ¡ °D2] (16)
0 < [1 ¡ ¸°]±D2 ¡ [1 ¡ ¸¼
¤
C] ¹ g (17)
Let © ´ ¸
£
¼¤
CgV ¡ °D2 ¡ °¼¤
Cp¤¤
, B1 ´ ¸[¼¤
C¹ g ¡ °D2] and B2 ´ [1 ¡ ¸°]±D2¡
[1 ¡ ¸¼¤
C] ¹ g. It follows that
@©
@¸ < 0 @©
@¼¤
C > 0 @©























@¸ > 0 implies
@B2
@¸ > 0.25
Other things equal, decreases in ° and increases in ¼¤
C raise the likelihood of
activism while making it more e±cient as well. A decrease in ¸ also facilitates
activism, but it does not always make it more desirable. Finally, a decrease in the
equilibrium pledge p¤ favors the activist outcome, but it has no direct e®ect on its
e±ciency.
5.1.2 Size of the largest activist cell
First, note that the set A = V of activists in the population is itself a binomial
random graph ¡V;q. By Remark (2), C must be precisely the size of the largest
component of the graph ¡V;q.
Second, the possibility of multiple groups of size C means that ° ¸ C
A, with
equality holding only if there is one largest group. On the other hand, p¤ and ¼¤
C
are not a®ected by the number of groups, only by C.
Finally, ¸, ° and ¼¤
C are strictly increasing in C, while p¤ is decreasing in C.
I de¯ne here a property of the structure of linkages that will be central to the
outcome:
De¯nition 5 Let i 2 N, X µ N. Then, the degree kX [i] of the individual i within





Notation 6 Denote the expected degree of i 2 N within X µ N by hkX [i]i. Then,
hkX [i]i = q (X ¡ 1) if i is a member of X and hkX [i]i = qX if not. The expected
average degree of the members of X within X is called the \average degree of the set
X" and denoted hkXi.
hkXi = q (X ¡ 1) (18)
For instance, hkNi = q (n ¡ 1) and since the set of activists A = V has size n±,
hkAi = q (n± ¡ 1).
The following theorem from the random graphs literature, which I reproduce
without proof, helps relate the average degree of the activist set A to the size of C
in an in¯nite population.26
25See Appendix D.
26See Appendix A and Janson et al. [22, Ch.5. p.109, Theorem 5.4].
22Theorem 6 Let nq = k, where k is a constant. (i) If k < 1, then a.a.s. the
largest component of ¡n;q has at most 3
(1¡k)2 lnn vertices. (ii) Let k > 1 and let
¯ = ¯ (k) 2 (0;1) be de¯ned by the equation ¯ = 1 ¡ e¡¯k. Then ¡n;q contains
a giant component of (1 + o(1))¯n vertices. Furthermore, a.a.s. the size of the
second largest component of ¡n;q is at most 16k
(1¡k)2 lnn.
Part (ii) of Thm.6 holds for nq = 1 + ´, for ´ (n) > 0 decreasing to zero slowly
enough as n increases, in which case the size of the giant component is at least
(1 + ´)¯n vertices.27 Hence
Proposition 7 Let A µ N be the set of activists. Suppose also n > 1
±q. Then
the probability that the largest activist cell in the steady state of the activism game
contains at least ¯AA members of A converges uniformly to one as A ¡! 1 ,
where ¯A is an exponentially increasing function of ± [hkNi + 1] only, ¯A (1) = 0,
lim»¡!1 ¯A (») = 1 . If such a large cell is present, it is called the giant component.
Proof. Given that N has a random graph's structure with a constant uniform
probability of link q between any two individuals, any subset of N along with the
links among its members also does. In particular, the subset A of activists with all
links among themselves is a random graph ¡A;q, with the probability that any two
activists i;j 2 A be linked given by q. Since A = n±, the probability of appearance
of a giant component in A converges to 1 as A ¡! 1 if n±q > 1. By (18) the
(expected) average degree of A is hkAi = q (A ¡ 1) and hkNi = q (n ¡ 1). Combine
these to obtain n±q = ± [hkNi + 1]. By Thm.6 the result follows.
This result implies that the communication characteristics of the community
of V -types in the in¯nite population are not a smooth function of the network
parameters. In some range, any activism will involve relatively small activist groups,
and there may be several of size C{the community of V -types is subcritical. In a
higher connectivity range, the outcome changes discretely to one single largest group
whose size is a ¯nite fraction of the whole population. A is then supercritical. The
critical property of A is whether its average degree is above or below one, with
hkAi = ± hkNi ¡ (1 ¡ ±)q.28
Fig.4(a) depicts a phase diagram (n;qn) where each point ¡i is a possible popu-
lation with n vertices and probability of link q. As one moves right, letting n ! 1,
the expected fraction of people in the largest activist cell, given by C=n, converges
monotonically in probability to some value. If the limit graph is above the dashed
27Janson et al. [22, Ch.5, section 2].
28The expected size of C behaves approximately as:
E [C] »
½ 3
(1¡hkAi)2 lnA if hkAi + q < hkic = 1 (subcritical)
¯AA if hkAi + q > hkic = 1 (supercritical)
(19)
See Thm.6 and Appendix A. These are actually bounds: for subcritical graphs, the largest graph
is of size at most 3



























FIGURE 4: Phase diagram
Notes: Each point represents a possible population size and probability of link.
24line nq = 1=±, the limit of C=n is positive: a ¯nite fraction of the total population
is coordinated. This is the case of ¡02 and ¡03. (Graphs higher on the diagram have
higher expected C=n.)
On the other hand, if the limit graph is below the line nq = 1=±, like ¡05 or ¡06,
C=n converges to zero. Still, C is larger in ¡06 than in ¡05, for example.
The main feature of Thm.6 is that, even if one lets ¡06 and ¡03 be arbitrarily
close to the threshold line, the di®erence in their respective largest cells remains
discrete in the following sense. At n = 1, graphs above the line have supercritical
activist communities. As ¡03 approaches the threshold, C=n converges to zero, but
the structure of C always spans the whole population in the sense that it is of the
same magnitude as n. Also, C is unique. In constrast, as ¡06 gets closer to the
threshold, it still has a multitude of cells of size C, and each one is local { its size is
not of the same order of magnitude as n. Thus, the transition is not quantitative,
but rather qualitative.
For ¯nite size graphs, being higher in the diagram for a given n also means
having a larger expected C. For instance, ¡2, ¡3, ¡6 and ¡5 are ordered from largest
to smallest expected C. However, for all of them the expected C=n is positive.
Moreover, the convergence to the limit graph as n grows is smooth through every
path, even though the limit has a discontinuity at the threshold nq = 1=±. As a
result, for ¯nite graphs far to the right, the di®erence in expected C=n just across
the threshold must be very large.
Fig.4(b) illustrates three comparisons among ¯nite populations. ¡1 and ¡3 have
the same size n but di®erent q. ¡2 and ¡3 have the same average degree but di®erent
n and q. Finally, ¡1 and ¡2 have the same q, given by the slope of the straight line
O¡1¡2, but di®erent size n.
Clearly, increases in n with any ¯xed q > 0 will always result in a supercritical
A for in¯nite n. The same is true for any q that does not decrease quickly enough
as n grows.29
Let me summarize what these results mean in our game. If the average degree
of A is below the critical threshold, most activists are not able to meet each other.
They are most likely isolated or in relatively small groups. Their ability to reach R-
types is in consequence very limited. Activism, if it takes place, is local. Moreover,
there are probably several groups of activists of similar size.
On the other hand, if the average degree of A is above the critical threshold,
the local communication between neighboring activists described here su±ces to
bring together a large fraction of all existing activists. A unique largest activist cell
appears with a size of the same order of magnitude of the population size n. In this
29See Note 21.
25case activism has a global reach. In a sense, it permeates the whole population,
regardless of size.
This largest supercritical cell of activists scales its size in linear proportion with
increases in the number of activists A in the population, as long as the average
degree hkAi is kept constant. Even as n ! 1, the fraction of members of the
population involved in activism remains positive. However, hkAi increases with n
for given q. Thus, if one ¯xes q and allows hkAi to increase with the population,
the size of the largest cell of activists scales up at a faster rate than the population
itself.
In the rest of this section I identify what parameter changes may tip the value
of hkAi across the critical threshold and analyze the comparative statics of C that
do not involve a transition.
5.1.3 Phase transitions
Scaling n with constant hkNi and ± This is perhaps the most interesting type
of scaling. It implies adding members to the population while making sure that the
average number of neighbors remains constant. In Fig.4(b), this corresponds to a
movement to the right along a path that becomes roughly parallel to nq = 1=± for
large n. It is a very strong condition, as one might expect that any given individual
have more acquaintances in a larger population{even if the increase is less than
proportional.











and thus hkAi converges to ± hkNi from below as n grows. For large n, an increase
in population size is in general unlikely to tip A through the threshold, but it may
happen. If so, the graph goes from the subcritical to the supercritical region.
If the random network of activists ¡A;q is close to its critical threshold, the
likelihood that an increase in n be enough to change the outcome of the game will
be very high. Equivalently, the expected return of an increase in the population is
very large for a critical network.
The model yields stronger results for two other types of scaling, presented below.
Scaling n with constant q and ± If n grows but q remains constant, the resulting
change is a movement outward along a ray from the origin in Fig.4(b). The expected
number of neighbors of each individual grows proportionally with n. This e®ect is
added to the ¯rst-order e®ect of the increase in C. Most importantly, this type of
change guarantees that any subcritical set A of activists will eventually reach the
critical average degree, as hkAi grows with A = n±.
26Increases in q for given population size n and ± An increase in q is a vertical
displacement upwards in Fig.4(b). It can clearly cause the transition to large scale
activism. Increasing q may re°ect a direct e®ort to improve the connectivity of the







measure of the expected return to investment in the social network.
Changes in the composition of the population ± for given n;q Although
the type of an individual is not an endogenous decision in this model, this analysis
in particular provides some ties to the standard literature of public goods provision
by means of an analogy to a pivotal player's incentives. It is not a scaling of the
population, nor does it re°ect connectivity improvements. Rather, it measures the
return to magically switching the type of some individuals in the population from R
to V , thus gaining some extra activists. In Fig.4(b), it corresponds to a downward
shift of the threshold curve 1=±.
(15) does not depend directly on ±. However, the shift in the transition threshold
a®ects © through C. If the initial population is just below the threshold, it may
become supercritical as ± increases.
In (16) the direct e®ect of a larger ± is to make the incomplete network less
desirable by increasing the number of activists who incur D1. At the same time,




> D1. In any
case, if C experiences the phase transition, this e®ect is dominated by the changes
in the right hand side of the condition.





> °D2. Again, any transition-related changes dominate the
outcome.
5.1.4 Comparative statics within each regime
Even if a change in the network's parameters does not tip A across the critical
threshold, it is interesting to ask what its impact on the number of supporters
reached may be. The following proposition addresses this question.
Proposition 8 Let AR denote a set consisting of the activists in C and all their
R-type neighbors. That is, AR is the set of supporters of the public good. (i) If
hkAi > 1, then AR=n converges in probability to a positive number as n increases.
(ii) If hkNi < 1, then AR=n < 3
(1¡hkNi)2
lnn
n as n increases.
Proof. To prove (i), simply notice that N > AR > C. Since C=n converges
to a positive number, the same is true for AR=n. For (ii), N itself is a subcritical
graph, and so is A as well. In this case, there may be several cells C, each with its
corresponding AR. However, each of those sets AR is at most as large as the largest
clusters in N, since it is necessarily a subset of some cluster: a cluster in N that
27contains C must also contain its neighbors. By Thm.6, the largest clusters in N are
of size 3
(1¡hkNi)2 lnn. The result follows.
The comparative statics analyses in the previous section dealt with the e®ects of
the transition on the game's outcome. However, the question remained open whether
the communities at either side of the threshold had the same behavior otherwise.
This theorem shows that is not the case. The supercritical and subcritical regimes
are qualitatively di®ferent in that increases in the population size have di®erent
e®ects in the potential reach of collective action. If the community of activists is
supercritical, increases in the population likely improve the chances of emergence of
cooperation. If the population as a whole{and therefore the community of activists
as well{is subcritical, increases in the population size lead to decreases in the fraction
of people that can be reached by means of activism. The likelihood of activism taking
place then decreases.
Proposition 8 does not describe all possible cases. It provides no results for the
range where hkAi < 1 but hkNi > 1. However, it succeeds in establishing that even
small changes in the parameters of the game have di®erent e®ects on its outcome
depending on whether the activist community is supercritical or subcritical.
6 Conclusion
Let me ¯rst state clearly what this model is not meant to argue.
It is by no means implied that the structure of the linkages among the people
in a real society (or within a particular group of it) has a binomial random graph
structure. Research in social networks within professions and economic agents sug-
gests that the actual structure of such networks is di®erent in at least two ways:
it has a certain lumpiness to it, and some individuals have a very large degree, i.e.
many neighbors.30 The binomial random graph model does not have these features,
which seem essential to a realistic model of social networks.31
Neither am I suggesting that activism, or its motivation, originate in some in-
trinsic quality of each individual, although that is a matter of controversy. I am not
so much concerned with the initiation of activism as I am with its reach.
30The formal name for this lumpiness is clustering. Measured in the random graphs literature by
the clustering coe±cient, it re°ects the transitivity of the linkage structure. Say Elsa knows John,
and John knows Laura; what is the probability that Elsa know Laura? If it is high, the expected
clustering coe±cient is high, and the result is likely to be a network structure with lumps: there
will be groups of people where everyone knows almost everyone else, but the links across such
groups are relatively few.
See [2], [23], [35], [47], [12], [27].
31Several alternative models exist which lay a claim to be more accurate in this sense. Perhaps
the best known is the Small World model, proposed by Watts and Strogatz [47] (see also Newman et
al. [23]), roughly the superimposition of a binomial random graph on a dense network of spatially
local links.
28The underlying premises in this paper are twofold. First, any implementable
mechanism to coordinate individuals in a society is bound to have limitations in
the amount of interested parties that can actually be reached. Second, coordination
can be achieved through indirect interaction between individuals, without the need
for strongly centralized institutions, as long as the costs of such an endeavor are
not prohibitive for any one activist. If that is the case, a question of interest for a
given potential activist is what her chance of success in reaching enough supporters
is. This model shows that a critical feature of the society in this context is its
connectivity.
It is surely no surprise that in a society whose members are well interconnected,
the existing activists stand a high chance of being themselves well interconnected. It
is not surprising either that this has a positive e®ect on the ability to gather enough
supporters for any given cause. What is new in this paper is the insight that the
transition between \not su±ciently interconnected" (subcritical network structure)
and \well enough interconnected" (supercritical) is not a gradual one, but rather
a sharp jump as one changes the network's connectivity. If the network is close to
this transition threshold, small variations in its linkages may yield large changes in
the occurrence and success rates of collective action.
A second result has to do with the increases in the size of the population un-
der certain scaling conditions. In this model, the connectivity threshold for the
transition falls as the population grows. It may then be easier to obtain successful
decentralized activism in larger communities. In contrast with the previous litera-
ture, this result holds as the the number of agents becomes in¯nitely large. This
is consistent with the existence of large-scale activism in large populations, a phe-
nomenon not explained by previous models.
Even without a transition from one regime to another, the model shows that
small increases in population have very di®erent e®ects on the likelihood of collective
action in each regime. In supercritical populations, having more people increases the
chances of activism taking place. In at least some range of subcritical populations,
the result is the opposite.
In the speci¯c case of my model, the results indicate that a supercritically net-
worked activist community within a population will not face increasing per capita
marginal costs of activism when expanding its reach to gather support for its cause
(e.g. the provision of a public good). In practice, if the population interested in the
cause is large enough, one may expect an institutionalized coordinating agent like a
government to take action. Thus, the main bearing of these results are (1) medium-
sized populations, not large enough to grant direct intervention by a coordinating
agent; or (2) public goods that preclude institutional action.
These results suggest that investment in the construction of social networks
may have very large returns for societies that are close to the transition region.
In consequence, one may not require large changes in social networks to explain
29great variance in outcomes of collective endeavors. A further, more controversial
suggestion stems from the comparative statics on ±. Under imperfect information,
proximity to the transition threshold may provide the rationale for an individual to
think that she has a high probability of being pivotal in the provision of the good.
While the particular network structure model in this paper was chosen for an-
alytical tractability, these regime transitions in networks are relatively well-studied
and robust phenomena in the mathematics and physics literature dealing with ran-
dom graphs and percolation. Features like clustering and large degree members
are the focus of an extensive body of research and can yield valuable insights into
the dynamic aspects of collective action and other collective economic phenomena
that take place in networks. Further research avenues in this direction should in-
clude extensions of graph models to allow for costly endogenous construction of new
links (investment in social networks), more heterogeneous linkage structures, the su-
perimposition of competing activist groups and perhaps the possibility of dynamic
learning by individuals.
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Notes: A typical random network. The lines indicate links between individuals. This is a graph
with 16 vertices and p = 0:15 approximately.
A Random graphs
Random graphs were ¯rst studied using probabilistic theory by Paul Erd} os and Alfred
R¶ enyi in a series of papers starting in 1959.(Erd} os and R¶ enyi [18]) The model they used,
called the uniform random graph model, was di®erent from the one in this paper in that
they speci¯ed a graph by the number of nodes and links rather than using a probability of
link and the number of nodes. However, the results are esentially the same in both models
(they are equivalent in the limit of large graphs), and the intuition is interchangeable. The
version of the results I present in this appendix follows closely Barab¶ asi [2], and it pertains
to the binomial random graph model. For an exhaustive analysis of random graphs, the
reader should refer to Bollob¶ as [10], Janson et al. [22] and Tutte [46].
One can think of a graph G as consisting of a set V (G) of elements called vertices
and a set E (G) of elements called edges. Each edge is a pair fx;yg of elements, where
x;y 2 V (G). It is useful to visualize this as points (the vertices) joined by lines (the
edges), as in ¯gure 5. Thus, the edge fx;yg 2 E (G) joins the vertices x and y, both of
which are in V (G).
A random graph ¡ is one where the edges in E (G) are chosen randomly with some
probability from the universe of all possible pairs fx;yg where x;y 2 V (G). Exactly how
they are chosen is determined by the particular model used. In this paper, I use the
binomial random graph model, where, for any two vertices x;y, the probability that the
edge fx;yg be in E (G) is given by the constant scalar q 2 [0;1]. To avoid confusion,
one may want to distinguish between a particular realization of the set of edges, which I
denote E (G) (and the graph G = (V (G);E (G))), and the random graph ¡V (G);q. Also,
because the elements of V (G) are interchangeable, we can speak of ¡n;q where n is the
number of vertices.
It should be noted before going any further that most results in the theory of random
graphs are by nature asymptotical. They hold with certainty in the limit of n ¡! 1
only. What makes them interesting even in ¯nite (albeit large) n is that they hold for the
overwhelming majority of possible realizations.
34In the binomial formulation of the random graph model, the total number of edges
m is a random variable. Its expected value is E [m] = qn(n ¡ 1)=2. The probability of
obtaining a given graph G0 with m edges is Pr[G0] = qm (1 ¡ q)
n(n¡1)
2 ¡m. Although a
higher probability of link q does not guarantee a higher number m of links, the mathe-
matical literature on random graphs does associate these two parameters.32 Thus, q = 1
corresponds to m =
n(n¡1)
2 and q = 0 to m = 0.
The main issue in this model is to ¯nd out the probability of link at which certain prop-
erties become common in the graphs. Perhaps surprisingly, many important properties of
the graphs appear quite suddenly, and they become almost universal very quickly.
For many properties, one can ¯nd a probability threshold below which almost no graph
has them, and above which almost every graph does. This probability threshold depends
on the number of vertices in the graph, and is thus a function qc (n).33 For random
graphs with constant probability of link q, increasing the number of vertices increases
the number of existing links very quickly. This has the particular e®ect that qc (n) is
decreasing (indeed, it may converge to zero) for many of the more interesting properties.
One particular property, however, de¯nes a critical threshold independent of n: the average
degree of the graph34
hki = q (n ¡ 1) ' qn
In other words, there is a critical average degree of the graph, hkic = 1 for all n, which
de¯nes the critical probability threshold for a number of properties:




Among the properties of interest is the size of the largest cluster present.35 If q (n) <
qc (n) [ hki < hkic ], the largest cluster has a simple structure and its size is proportional to
ln(n) or ln(hki=q), i.e. grows only slowly with the size of the graph. However, for q (n) =
qc (n) [ hki = hkic = 1 ], the size of this cluster is approximately n2=3 and its structure
becomes very complex. Finally, for q (n) > qc (n) [ hki > hkic ], this complex cluster,
called the giant component, contains a ¯nite fraction 1¡f (hki) of the n vertices available,
where f (hki) is an exponentially decreasing function with f (1) = 1 and f (1) = 0. I
reproduce here without proof a version of this result from Janson et al. [22, Ch.5. p.109,
Theorem 5.4], Thm.6:
32Indeed, one can prove that they are equivalent in the limit of large n (Janson [22, Ch.1]).
33Let q be a function of the number of vertices, q = q (n). Then, qc (n) the critical probability
threshold for the property Q satis¯es
lim
n¡!1









If this limit is 1, then , for q = q (n), almost every (or almost all) graphs have property Q.
Alternatively, ¡n;q has property Q almost surely.
34The degree of a vertex is the number of edges that are incident on it. The average degree of a
graph is the average degree over all vertices. Since there n(n ¡ 1)=2 possible edges, each ocurring
with probability q, the expected number of edges is qn(n ¡ 1)=2. Dividing by the number n of
vertices and multiplying by two (each edge touches two vertices, after all), one obtains the expected
average degree of the graph. Or, according to common usage, the average degree of the graph.
35A cluster is a subset of vertices, each of whom can be reached from any other through a path
of interconnected vertices in the graph, all of which are also part of the cluster.
35Theorem 9 (6) Let nq = k, where k is a constant. (i) If k < 1, then a.a.s. the largest
component of ¡n;q has at most 3
(1¡k)2 lnn vertices. (ii) Let k > 1 and let ¯ = ¯ (k) 2
(0;1) be de¯ned by the equation ¯ = 1 ¡ e¡¯k. Then ¡n;q contains a giant component of
(1 + o(1))¯n vertices. Furthermore, a.a.s. the size of the second largest component of
¡n;q is at most 16k
(1¡k)2 lnn.
The transition described in Thm.6 is abrupt in the value of k for in¯nite n. However,
for a given n, as q increases, it appears that the size of the largest cluster grows very
quickly, but smoothly, during the transition (Janson et al. [22, Ch.5, Sec 2]). This is also
the case for changes in n given q.
Other properties of ¡n;q help obtain some insight about the implications of the ap-
pearance of the giant component. In the supercritical regime, all other large (non-giant)
clusters tend to dissappear. Only small clusters survive unattached to the giant one, and
relatively few vertices belong to them. This means that the graph is spanned by a single
cluster of size of the same order as her own, and not by a collection of small isolated
clusters.
Perhaps an alternative thought experiment is more useful to understand the intuition
behind these results. Consider for a moment a construction of a given subset X µ N
by adding members one by one according to the random sequence i1;i2;i3;:::iX. The
¯rst member, i1, cannot possibly have neighbors, as she is alone. The second member
i2 is linked to i1 with probability q. i3 is linked to each one of these with probability
q, and she is isolated with probability (1 ¡ q)
2. i4 is more interesting. For the sake of
argument, suppose that i1 and i2 turned out to be linked, but i3 was isolated as seen in
Fig.6(b). Then, i4 is linked to i3 with probability q, but to either i1 or i2 (a multi-activist
group) with probability 1¡(1 ¡ q)
2 > q. Further consideration of this scenarios yields two
insights: First, the likelihood of im<X being linked to at least another member increases
the more activists there are already, since she has a probability q of being a neighbor of
any particular one. Second, and due to the same reason, the likelihood of im being linked
to an already existing group of interconnected members increases the more members that
group has.
If m is a small number, im stands a fair chance to be isolated. Even if she turns out
to be linked to some previous member im0<m, chances are that member had no neighbors,
so that they are now a group of two. At most, im will be in a small group. If m is instead
a \medium" number (loosely speaking), there will likely exist several groups of various
sizes. In that case, im has a disproportionately higher probability of being linked to them
precisely because they have more members (Fig.6(c)). Moreover, among those groups, im
is most likely to link with the larger ones. Even further, im may even act as a bridge,
linking two or more existing groups, an event that is more likely the larger those groups
are. This last possibility will in time (i.e. for large m) determine the appearance of an
unusually large group, more than twice the size of any other, that will quickly annex all
other groups, except for very small ones. Any remotely big groups still unlinked to the
large group are very likely to be annexed thanks to the next member that is added.
The literature on random graphs provides some interesting results concerning the size
and properties of such a large group, called the giant component. Perhaps counter to
intuition, its expected size scales up linearly with the number of members in X, for ¯xed
average degree hkXi, and even more than linearly for ¯xed q. Moreover, while it is not
certain that it will exist in small subsets (even if X > 1

























FIGURE 6: Thought experiment
Notes: In (a), all links are equally probable. In (b) i4 is linked to i3 with probability q, but to
either i1 or i2 (a multi-activist group) with probability 1¡(1 ¡ q)
2 > q. The larger a pre-existing
group is, the more likely it is that the next member is linked to it. In general, the probability of
being linked to a group with k members is Pr[k] = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ q)k
appearance converges very quickly to 1 as X ¡! 1.36
The dramatic consequences of the existence of the giant component become most
evident if one considers a change the scale of the graph. Suppose that the graph duplicates
its size n, but keeps k constant. If the graph is subcritical, the size of the largest cluster
will increase by ln2 (not much). Most of the e®ects will be felt in the number of clusters
present. If the graph is supercritical, however, the number of clusters (in particular large
ones) will decrease, but the size of the largest cluster will double.
If one considers increases in n keeping q rather than k constant, as in this paper,
even graphs that are originally subcritical become eventually supercritical. The size of
the largest cluster grows then at a rate faster than n itself in the neighborhood of the
transition.
B Individual preferences
The R-type preferences can be argued as a result of community enforcement of norms
[24]. Alternatively, they are similar to the \warm glow" utility in the impure altruism
literature, as shown next. Let R-type individuals have homogeneous preferences de¯ned
over consumption of a discrete public good G, the numeraire x, and a parameter T,
intended to capture each invidual's private bene¯t from being a truthful citizen:





1 if the individual is truthful
0 otherwise
¾
and " > 0 is a measure of the importance of this "warm glow" for the reluctant individuals.
" is assumed to be the identical across the V -type population for simplicity. Moreover,
assume that each individual is endowed with w units of the private good.






One can further de¯ne implicitly for type R individuals the \personal valuation of truth-
fulness" h > 0 by
u(w ¡ h;1) + " = u(w;1)
Andreoni [3],[4] shows that this warm glow, in practice a private bene¯t derived from
the act of giving to the public good, may increase the level of provision and make it
a function of the income distribution. It reduces but does not eliminate the free-rider
problem. More important for the purpose of the present paper, it does not address the
issue of the coordination failure in the game.
C Optimal pledge proposal
I now characterize the interior solution for p¤ in the required low range ps · gV ¡ Y V .
First, I need the probability ¼C = ¼C (p) of a successful fundraiser given coordination.
Let µ ´ (1 ¡ q)
C, the probability that any given R-type not be a neighbor of C. If the
number of R-type supporters is s, and p · h, the probability of a successful fundraiser for
given C is



















j µn¡A¡j for p 2 (ps¡1;ps]












j µn¡A¡j for p 2 (ps¡1;ps]
Substituting s = G















j µn¡A¡j for p 2 (ps¡1;ps] (20)
Since ¢sp = ¡G





s¡1 µn¡A¡s+1 < 0, (9) always










FIGURE 7: Optimal pledge
Notes: s is the minimum number of supporters that must be reached for successful provision of the
good. The arrows indicate the direction of increasing payo® to the V -types, so s¤ is the optimum.
The associated proposed pledge is p¤ = ps¤ = G=(C + s¤).
involve p¤ = ps¤ < gV ¡ Y V . Replace to obtain
Increase s if
(C + s ¡ 1)
·
gV ¡ Y V
G
















Both sides of this condition are depicted in Fig.7, along with the optimal solution.
D Some calculations
At the optimum,
s¤ = s¤ (n;C;µ)













































































































@C = µln(1 ¡ q) < 0 and @µ
@q = ¡C
1¡qµ < 0.
Consider the expressions © ´ ¸
£
¼¤
CgV ¡ °D2 ¡ °¼¤
Cp¤¤
, B1 ´ ¸[¼¤
C¹ g ¡ °D2] and
B2 ´ [1 ¡ ¸°]±D2 ¡ [1 ¡ ¸¼¤
C]¹ g. Di®erentiate to obtain
dB1 = [¼¤
C¹ g ¡ °D2]d¸ + [¸¹ g]d¼¤
C ¡ [¸D2]d°
dB2 = [¼¤
















@¸ < 0 @©
@¼¤
C > 0 @©
@° < 0 @©
@p¤ < 0
@B1
@¸ ? 0 @B1
@¼¤
C > 0 @B1
@° < 0
@B2




C > 0 @B2
@° = ± @B1
@° < 0
and @B1
@¸ > 0 implies @B2
@¸ > 0.
40E Notation
I provide here a summary of notation:
N The population set.
n Number of elements (size) of N.
G The public good.
G Cost of provision of G.
q Connectivity of the network. Denotes the probability of link between any two individ-
uals, so q 2 (0;1].
V;R Types of individuals: Volunteer and Reluctant.
± Fraction of individuals of type V .
gV ;gR Valuation of the good to each type of individual.
¹ g Average social value of G. ¹ g = ±gV + (1 ¡ ±)gR.
h Warm glow from telling the truth for an R-type.
¡v;e A random graph with v vertices and e edges.
A (In normal font) it denotes both the set of activists and its size.
C Both the largest activist cell and its size.
AR (In normal font) a set consisting of C and all its R-type neighbors. Also, the size of
this set.





C < gV ¡ Y V
i
, the ex-ante (time t = 0) probability that a fundraiser takes
place.
D1 Cost of becoming an activist.
D2 Cost of taking part in a fundraising drive.
p Proposed pledge in the fundraising drive.
Zmax Maximum attainable voluntary contribution from V -types.
L Welfare loss due to the costs of activism.
Y =
¡
Y V ;Y R¢
Payo®s if no activism takes place (outside option).
W Expected payo® to activists not in C.
µ Probability that any given R-type not be a neighbor of C.
¼C Probability of success of the fundraising drive, conditional on C.
41s Number of R-types that C plans to reach.
ps Optimal pledge as a function of s.
hkXi Average degree of X. It is the expected number of neighbors, in X, of any member
of X.
Optimal values of the choice parameters are denoted everywhere by an asterisk (¤).
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